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Abstract
In this paper, we use data from the first two rounds of the European Social
Survey to analyze the extent to which diﬀerences in average attitudes towards
immigration across the EU-15 countries may be explained by diﬀerences in
socioeconomic characteristics and individually perceived consequences of im-
migration, using an extension of a decomposition technique developed by
Fairlie (2005). We find that despite the significant eﬀects of socioeconomic
characteristics on attitudes, diﬀerences in the distributions of these charac-
teristics can only explain a modest share of the cross-country variation in
average attitudes. A larger part can be explained by diﬀerences in perceived
consequences of immigration, but the main part is still left unexplained.
Apart from providing useful input for policy makers working in the area of
immigration policy, this raises a number of questions for further research for
which the ESS data can be successfully applied.
Keywords: Attitudes, Immigration, Cross-country diﬀerences
JEL Classification: F1, F22, J61
1 Introduction
A number of recent studies have documented that attitudes towards immi-
gration vary across countries; see, e.g., Mayda (2006), Card et al. (2005),
Boeri and Brücker (2005), and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2005). In this pa-
per, we use data from the first two rounds of the European Social Survey
(ESS) to analyze the extent to which diﬀerences in average attitudes towards
immigration across the EU-15 countries may be explained by diﬀerences in
socioeconomic characteristics and individually perceived consequences of im-
migration.1 We do this by extending the decomposition technique developed
by Fairlie (2005), which in turn builds on the well-known Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition technique (Blinder, (1973); Oaxaca, (1973)).
A large number of empirical studies have previously explained attitudes
towards immigration using socioeconomic characteristics; see, e.g., Scheve
and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2006). A smaller number of studies have
also included perceived consequences of immigration among the explanatory
variables, see, e.g., Dustmann and Preston (2004), Card et al. (2005) and
Malchow-Møller et al. (2006). However, it has not yet been analyzed whether
these characteristics in fact can explain observed cross-country diﬀerences
in average attitudes towards immigration. This is what the current paper
attempts.
Why is this relevant? First, in the academic literature it has been dis-
cussed whether the EU countries should optimally harmonize their immi-
gration policies; see, e.g., Wellisch and Wildasin (1996), Casella (2005), and
Boeri and Brücker (2005). Thus, it has recently been argued by, e.g., Boeri
and Brücker (2005) that with unilateral immigration policies, we may end
up observing a suboptimal ”race to the top” where countries compete to
introduce the most restrictive rules. A harmonizations of EU immigration
policies could rectify this problem.
Second, the EU countries have already taken some steps towards a harmo-
nization of their immigration policies. Since May 2004, the Council can take
decisions by "qualified majority" vote in questions regarding immigration
policy and already in 1999, the European Council agreed that the questions
concerning asylum and immigration demands that a common EU policy is
designed.
Thus, there is a growing awareness both among politicians and academics
that at least some harmonization of immigration policies among the EU
1The EU-15 countries or the "old" EU countries are the members of EU before the
enlargement in 2004. These include: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria Finland, and Swe-
den.
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countries is required. But the feasibility of such policies are often influenced
by people’s attitudes. At least from a political economy perspective, we may
expect such attitudes to play a role, since politicians are often concerned
about getting reelected, and hence will be interested in the feelings of the
voters towards immigrants (Bauer et al., 2000).
In light of this, a better understanding of what drives cross-country dif-
ferences in attitudes could provide useful input for the process of policy
harmonization within the EU. It may, for instance, provide guidance for how
to compensate the most sceptical countries/individuals. If, for example, so-
cioeconomic diﬀerences explain a large part of the diﬀerences, compensating
measures or special attention should be directed towards the most sceptical
socioeconomic groups rather than sceptical countries. If instead perceived
consequences of immigration explain cross-country diﬀerences, it may be cru-
cial for policy makers to address these concerns (instead of specific groups)
explicitly in a common immigration policy
The ESS data are well-suited for a cross-country analysis of attitudes, as
they not only contain information about attitudes towards immigration and
perceived consequences of immigration for all EU-15 countries. The questions
have also been designed to ensure that they are understood in the same way
across countries.
We focus our analysis on attitudes towards immigration from poor coun-
tries as most of the debate on immigration policies in Europe concerns im-
migration from such countries. However, we distinguish explicitly between
attitudes towards immigration from poor European and poor non-European
countries, respectively, as these attitudes are relevant for two diﬀerent pol-
icy areas. While the former is relevant for traditional immigration policies,
attitudes towards immigration from poor European countries may also have
implications for future enlargements of the EU as well as the potential har-
monization of the transitional arrangements put in place in connection with
such enlargements.
The first step of the empirical analysis is to estimate logit models of
attitudes towards diﬀerent types of immigration. In these regressions, we
include the usual socioeconomic explanatory variables from the existing lit-
erature. In line with some more recent studies, we also include a number
of variables capturing perceived consequences of immigration. The second
step is to use the estimated logit models to decompose the average diﬀer-
ences across countries into a part due to observable characteristics of the
individuals (socioeconomic characteristics and perceptions) and a part due
to diﬀerent eﬀects of these characteristics across countries. In doing this we
extend a technique developed by Fairlie (2005) for decomposing diﬀerences
in averages of binary outcomes between two groups, e.g., gender and racial
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gaps in college attendance. In our case, we compare 15 groups (countries),
and we therefore develop a decomposition where we compare each country
to the mean of all other countries — including the country itself.
In line with previous studies, we document that there is considerable
variation in average attitudes across countries. Furthermore, we find that
attitudes also vary substantially with socioeconomic characteristics. Poor or
unemployed people or people with only primary education tend to be more
negative towards immigration whereas people living in urban areas, with
an immigrant background, or with tertiary education tend to be the most
positive towards immigration. These findings are also well in line with those
of the existing literature. Furthermore, those who perceive that immigrants
will aﬀect labour market options of natives negatively or strain the public
budget are also more negative towards immigration.
Despite the significant eﬀects of socioeconomic characteristics on atti-
tudes, diﬀerences in the distributions of these characteristics across countries
are only able to explain a modest share of the cross-country variation in av-
erage attitudes. A larger part can be explained by diﬀerences in perceived
consequences of immigration, but the main part is still left unexplained.
Apart from providing useful input for policy makers working in the area
of immigration policy, this raises a number of questions for further research
for which the ESS data can be successfully applied: First, what underlies
the large unexplained cross-country diﬀerences? Second, why do perceived
consequences vary across individuals and countries? We shall return to these
questions at the end of the paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the
ESS data. Section 3 outlines the empirical approach, while Sections 4 and
5 contain the empirical analysis. In Section 4, we explain attitudes towards
immigration on the basis of socioeconomic and perception variables, while
we decompose country diﬀerences in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 ESS Data
We use data from the first two rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS),
2002/3 and 2004/5, which cover 22 and 26 European and associated coun-
tries, respectively. However, in this paper, we only use data for the EU-15
countries. The ESS interviews around 2,000 randomly selected persons of age
15 or above in each country.2 ESS 2002/3 contains a special module with
2There are minor deviations from random sampling in some countries. We correct for
this non-random sampling within countries as well as diﬀerences in sample/population
ratios across countries in the analyses to follow.
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a number of questions about people’s attitudes towards immigration. This
module is unique in the sense that it also contains questions about the respon-
dents’ perceptions of the (economic) implications of immigration. Further-
more, both rounds of the ESS hold information about people’s educational
background, labour market association and a number of other background
characteristics.
The questions in the ESS have been carefully designed to ensure that they
are understood in the same way across countries. This is important because
the European countries are very diverse with respect to culture, language,
immigration history and immigration laws. For example, the word “immi-
grant” has been avoided in the questionnaire because this word has diﬀerent
connotations in diﬀerent countries. Instead, the questionnaire refers to “peo-
ple who come to live in the country”.3 Furthermore, special attention has
been given to ensure that the questions about the respondents’ preferences
for the restrictiveness of the immigration policy are understood in the same
way across countries. This makes the ESS data particularly useful for a
cross-country comparison of attitudes towards immigration as in the present
paper. We refer to Card et al. (2005) for more details on the design of the
questionnaire.
In the empirical analyses below, we will use a number of variables to
capture diﬀerent aspects of individual attitudes towards immigration. The
respondents in ESS 2002/3 have all been asked separately about their atti-
tudes towards immigration from rich and poor countries, within and outside
Europe, respectively, whereas the respondents in ESS 2004/5 have only been
asked about their attitudes towards immigration from poorer countries out-
side Europe. The possible answers to these five questions were: "allow many
to come and live here", "allow some", "allow a few", and "allow none".
From these questions, we construct four attitude variables. First, the vari-
able, Apoor_euro, is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the answer to the
question about immigrants from poor European countries in ESS 2002/3 was
either "allow a few" or "allow none". Apoor_noneuro_2002 and Apoor_noneuro_2004
are defined similarly from the questions about poor non-European immi-
grants in ESS 2002/3 and ESS 2004/5, respectively. Finally, Arelative_euro is
defined as a dummy variable taking the value one if the respondent in ESS
2002/3 has expressed a (strictly) less positive attitude towards immigrants
from poor European countries than from rich European countries. This rela-
tive measure of attitudes is included because in relation to EU enlargements,
it can be argued that it may be more relevant to consider attitudes towards
immigrants from new potential members (poor European countries) rela-
3We shall use the word immigrant in this paper to ease exposition.
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tive to attitudes towards immigrants from existing members (rich European
countries).
Table 2.1 presents country and EU-15 averages of the four attitude mea-
sures. At least three points can be observed from the Table. First, EU-15
citizens are generally more negative towards immigration from poor non-
European countries than from poor European countries. Second, attitudes
towards immigration from poor non-European countries became more neg-
ative from the first to the second round of the ESS. Third, EU-15 citizens
are generally more positive towards immigration from rich (European) than
poor (European) countries.
[Insert Table 2.1 around here]
Table 2.1 also shows that there is considerable variation across countries,
with Greece and Sweden as the two extremes. In Greece, around 85% op-
pose further immigration from poor countries (European and non-European),
while only around 15% express similar attitudes in Sweden. With respect to
the relative measure, Denmark and Greece exhibit the highest averages, but
for diﬀerent "reasons". While Greeks are more critical of immigrants from
poor countries than the average EU-15 citizen, the average Dane is somewhat
more positive towards immigration from rich countries.
In the analyses to follow, we use a number of individual characteristics to
explain the attitudes towards immigration. In particular, we use: age (and
age squared), gender, living in an urban or a rural area, immigrant back-
ground (including both first and second generation immigrants), educational
level (primary, secondary or tertiary), unemployment (a dummy variable in-
dicating that the individual or his/her partner is unemployed), self employ-
ment (a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is self-employed),
recipient of social benefits (a dummy variable indicating that the individual
is retired, permanently sick or disabled, and therefore a potential recipient of
social benefits), and poorest quartile (a dummy for the individual belonging
to the poorest quartile in the EU-15 as measured by total household income).
Summary statistics of these variables can be found in Table 2.2 below.
We also construct seven perception variables, where five of these concern
possible economic consequences, while the last two concern consequences for
culture and crime, respectively. The perception variables are constructed as
dummy variables each taking the value 1 if the respondent agreed with the
corresponding statement among the following: "Average wages are gener-
ally brought down by immigrants"; "Immigrants harm economic prospects
of the poor more than the rich"; "Immigrants help to fill jobs where there are
shortages of workers"; "Immigrants take jobs away in country"; "Taxes and
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services: immigrants take more out than they put in"; "Country’s cultural
life is undermined by immigrants"; and "Immigrants make country’s crime
problems worse". With respect to the first three statements, the respon-
dents could choose between 5 answers from "Agree strongly" to "Disagree
strongly", while for the last four statements, the respondents could choose
their degree of "agreement" on a scale from 0 to 10. We assign the value one
to the corresponding dummy variable if the respondent has chosen an answer
above the middle (neutral) category.
[Insert Table 2.2 around here]
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the distribution of the socioeconomic
characteristics and perceptions across the EU-15 countries. We observe that
there are substantial diﬀerences across countries with respect to both socioe-
conomic characteristics and perceptions. As an example, the proportion of
people with tertiary education varies from 7.0% in Italy to 32.2% in Swe-
den. Another example is that in Sweden only 15% agree that average wages
are generally being brought down by immigrants, while the corresponding
number in Greece is almost 82%. Thus, there appears to be considerable
room for explaining diﬀerences in average attitudes across countries by both
diﬀerences in socioeconomic characteristics and perceived consequences.
3 The Empirical Approach
Table 2.1 revealed considerable variation in average attitudes towards im-
migration across the EU countries. There can be two diﬀerent reasons for
this. First, diﬀerences may simply reflect diﬀerent distributions of explana-
tory factors across countries. That is, the positive attitudes of Swedes may
just reflect a diﬀerent socioeconomic composition of the Swedish people, e.g.,
that Swedes are more educated and that educated individuals are generally
more positive towards immigration. Alternatively, diﬀerences may reflect
that diﬀerent factors determine attitudes in the diﬀerent countries. The
main purpose of this paper is to determine the relative importance of these
reasons. In other words, when we take out that part of the diﬀerences which
can be explained by a diﬀerent distribution of observable factors (explanatory
variables), how large are the resulting diﬀerences?
In the existing literature, individual attitudes towards immigration have
been explained by socioeconomic characteristics, see, e.g., Scheve and Slaugh-
ter (2001) and Mayda (2006). A particular focus in this literature has been
on the role played by education, where most studies find that the less edu-
cated are considerably more opposed to immigration. A smaller number of
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more recent studies have included individually perceived consequences of im-
migration — mostly economic but also cultural/social consequences — among
the explanatory variables; see Dustmann and Preston (2004), Hainmueller
and Hiscox (2005), Card et al. (2005), and Malchow-Møller et al. (2006).
The empirical analysis in this paper proceeds in two steps. In Section
4, we estimate logit models for each of the four attitude variables, includ-
ing the usual socioeconomic explanatory variables among the regressors. In
some of the regressions, we also include the dummies capturing individually
perceived consequences of immigration. In Section 5, we then decompose the
diﬀerences in average country attitudes into: i) a part that is due to diﬀerent
observable characteristics of individuals across countries, i.e., diﬀerent distri-
butions across countries of the explanatory variables used in the regressions
in Section 4; and ii) a part that is due to diﬀerent eﬀects of these character-
istics, i.e., diﬀerent "coeﬃcients" in the estimations, including diﬀerences in
unobservable factors.
The technique used for this purpose was originally developed for linear
models by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), and has recently been extended
to logit and probit models by Fairlie (2005). However, since Fairlie (2005)
is comparing the average predicted probabilities of only two groups, e.g.,
unemployment incidence of blacks and whites, we extend his method to allow
for more than two groups in the comparison. More precisely, we compare
averages of 15 groups (countries), and we therefore focus on the diﬀerence
between each country’s average and the average of all countries (including
the country itself).
After estimating a logit model with country specific intercepts and slopes,
the diﬀerence between the average attitude in country i, A¯i, and the average
EU attitude, A¯EU , can (for each of the four attitude variables) be expressed
as:
A¯i − A¯EU =
X
j
vijF
³
Xij , βˆ
´
Σjvij
−
X
ij
vijF
³
Xij , βˆ
´
Σijvij
(1)
where Xij is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics and perceptions of
individual j in country i, vij is the sampling weight attached to individual j
in country i, βˆ is the estimated parameter vector in the model allowing for
country-specific intercepts and slopes, and F
³
Xij , βˆ
´
is thus the predicted
attitude (probability) of individual i in country j. The first term on the
right hand side in (1) is therefore the average predicted probability of being
against immigration for the individuals in country i, while the second term
is the average predicted probability for the entire EU-15. The equality in
(1) holds since a property of the logit model is that the average predicted
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attitude equals the actual proportion against immigration. If we had used
the probit model instead, this would not have been the case.
Now, building on Fairlie (2005), we can alternatively express the diﬀerence
in (1) as:
A¯i − A¯EU =
X
j
vijF
¡
Xij , β¯
¢
Σjvij
−
X
ij
vijF
³
Xij , βˆ
´
Σijvij
+
X
j
vijF
³
Xij , βˆ
´
Σjvij
−
X
j
vijF
¡
Xij, β¯
¢
Σjvij
(2)
where β¯ is a vector of EU averages of the estimated coeﬃcients, with the s’th
element of this vector given by:
β¯s =
P
i viβˆs,iP
i vi
(3)
where βˆs,i is the coeﬃcient for country i on the s’th explanatory variable,
and vi is the weight for country i.4
In equation (2), the first two terms on the right hand side express the
diﬀerence between country i and the EU average that can be ascribed to dif-
ferences in the distributions of the explanatory variables. The last two terms
on the right hand side express the part of the diﬀerence between country i
and the EU average which is due to diﬀerent coeﬃcients. These terms also
capture the part of the diﬀerence which is due to diﬀerences in unobservable
factors (diﬀerent intercepts).5
4 Explaining Attitudes towards Immigration
In Table 4.1 we present estimation results for the four diﬀerent attitude
measures. In the first four columns, only socioeconomic explanatory variables
are included on the right hand side whereas perceptions are added in the last
three columns. Note that perception variables are only available for the first
round of the ESS.
4Note that since the model is estimated by omitting coeﬃcients for a reference country,
βˆs,i is given by the overall coeﬃcient plus the coeﬃcient for country i. Instead of using
these average coeﬃcients, we could instead estimate the model without country specific
coeﬃcients and use the estimated coeﬃcients from this "pooled" regression as the EU
average coeﬃcients.
5As argued by Fairlie (2005), we cannot distinguish between the eﬀects of diﬀerent
intercepts across countries and the eﬀects of diﬀerent slopes.
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The models were estimated both with and without country-specific coeﬃ-
cients. For the decomposition in the following section, we rely on estimation
results for the "full" model with both country-specific intercepts and slopes.
However, to ease exposition and facilitate the review of the general (EU-
wide) eﬀects of the diﬀerent explanatory variables, Table 4.1 presents results
from the estimation with common slopes, but country-specific intercepts.6
[Insert Table 4.1 around here]
From the regressions where only socioeconomic variables are included, it
is seen that people living in urban areas, people with immigrant background
and people with tertiary education tend to be more positive towards immi-
gration from poor countries (European or non-European), whereas poor or
unemployed people and people with only primary education tend to be more
negative towards immigration.
The estimated coeﬃcients for the socioeconomic variables are fairly ro-
bust to the inclusion of perception variables, as seen in the last three columns
of the Table. The interesting part of these new regressions is thus the coef-
ficients to the perception variables. All the estimated coeﬃcients are statis-
tically significant with the expected signs. Thus, only the dummy referring
to the statement, "Immigrants help to fill jobs where there are shortages
of workers", has a negative coeﬃcient. That is, people agreeing that "immi-
grants help to fill jobs, where there are shortages of workers" have a tendency
to be more positive towards immigration, whereas people agreeing that "av-
erage wages are generally brought down by immigrants" or agreeing with one
of the other five perceptions tend to be more negative towards immigration
from poor countries, both European and non-European.
These results are in accordance with former results presented in the liter-
ature. The result that less educated are more negative towards immigration
has also been found by, e.g., Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006),
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2005), and Card et. al (2005). That older people
tend to be more negative towards immigration is also confirmed by several
other studies, e.g. Mayda (2006), Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006), Dustmann
and Preston (2004), and Malchow-Møller et al. (2006). Males being more
positive towards immigration is also reported by Mayda (2006), and she also
confirms that people with low incomes tend to be more negative towards
immigration. Furthermore, both Mayda (2006) and Scheve and Slaughter
(2001) find that immigrants and descendants of immigrants tend to be more
in favour of immigration. Finally, Card et. al (2005) also confirm the find-
ing that people believing that immigration is good for the economy tend
6Most results do not change qualitatively with the exclusion of country-specific slopes.
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to be more positive towards immigrants. On the other hand Dustmann
and Preston (2004) find that it is less likely that unemployed people are in
favour of a more restrictive immigration policy for immigrants from poorer
non-European countries, where we find that unemployed are more against
immigration from poorer countries (both European and non-European).
Now, turn to the results for the relative attitude measure. The eﬀects
of the perception variables are qualitatively the same, which means that if
you perceive immigration to have negative consequences for, e.g., domestic
wages, you are both more opposed to immigration in general and towards im-
migration from poor countries in particular. However, when it comes to the
eﬀects of the socioeconomic variables, there are some diﬀerences between the
relative attitude measure and the absolute measures. Thus, while males are
generally found to be more positive towards immigration in an absolute sense,
they tend to be relatively more negative towards immigration from poor Eu-
ropean countries compared to immigration from rich European countries. Or,
put diﬀerently, they tend to be relatively more positive towards immigration
from rich countries. The variables, urban and immigrant, reveal the same
diﬀerences between the relative attitude measure and the absolute attitude
measures.
Furthermore, while individuals with only a primary education are found
to be more negative towards immigration in an absolute sense than indi-
viduals with secondary education, they tend, somewhat surprisingly, to be
relatively more positive towards immigration from poor countries compared
to immigration from rich countries. Self-employed are also relatively more
in favour of immigration from poor countries, although they were not found
to have significant eﬀects on the absolute measures. Perhaps, they bene-
fit in particular from low-skilled labour inflow. Finally, while individuals
from poor households are generally more opposed to immigration, they do
not show particular preferences for rich immigrants compared to poor immi-
grants.
Note that we should be careful with the causal interpretation of the co-
eﬃcients on the perception variables. First, it could be that there are some
unobserved individual factors that both cause negative attitudes towards
immigration and at the same time influence people’s perceptions of the con-
sequences of immigration, e.g., fear of foreign people or foreign lifestyle. Sec-
ond, people could be trying to rationalize their negative attitudes towards
immigration. That is, if the respondent has first answered that only "a few"
or "none" immigrants should be allowed into the country, then (s)he might
try to justify this answer by also answering that (s)he expects immigration
to have negative consequences for natives in the labour market. This type of
endogeneity bias is referred to as justification bias in the literature.
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To determine the importance of the first endogeneity problem, we have
also run the regressions with the inclusion of two extra independent variables
that should capture the fear of foreign people or culture. The two variables
measure the extent to which the respondent will be negative towards having
a person with another ethnical background than the majority of the popula-
tion in the country as his/her boss or as married to a close relative. Both of
these variables have a significantly positive eﬀect on all four attitude mea-
sures, but when they are included in the regressions, the coeﬃcients for the
perception variables are only slightly aﬀected. We take this as an indication
that problems with this type of endogeneity are not substantial.
If, on the other hand, justification bias is a problem, we should observe
it for all groups. However, in a recent paper, Malchow-Møller et al. (2006),
we find that even though all people perceiving immigration to have nega-
tive consequences tend to be more negative towards immigration, the people
being hurt personally by these consequences have the most negative atti-
tudes. Thus, if a respondent agrees that immigrants take jobs away, then
the probability that (s)he will be against more immigration is higher, but
if, in addition, (s)he is out of work, (s)he is likely to be even more against
immigration. This shows that economic self-interest matters when attitudes
towards migration are formed and — more relevant for the endogeneity prob-
lem discussed here — it indicates that the perception variables capture what
they are supposed to. However it is not possible to completely exclude the
possibility of justification bias, and this should be taken into account in the
following.
5 Explaining Diﬀerences between Countries
The question we set out to answer in this section is: How much of the
deviation between the average attitude of country i citizens and that of EU-
15 citizens can be explained by a diﬀerent distribution of the observable
characteristics (socioeconomic and perceptions) in country i compared to
the EU-15 as a whole?
Table 5.1 contains decompositions for each of the four attitude measures.7
Decompositions are made both when using only the socioeconomic variables,
and when we also include the perception variables. The Table is constructed
as follows: Consider part A where the dependent variable is the measure for
7The estimates of the full model with country-specific intercepts and slopes which
underlie these decompositions are available upon request from the authors. The joint
significance of the country-specific coeﬃcients was tested (and confirmed) by use of a
Wald test.
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attitudes towards immigrants from poorer European countries. In the first
column, the total deviation for each country from the EU average is listed.
As an example, for Greece, the total deviation is 0.4076, meaning that the
probability of being against immigration is 40% higher in Greece than in the
EU-15 in general. The next two columns show the decomposition when we
control for socioeconomic variables alone. It appears that 0.0302 of the total
deviation (7.4 percent) is due to diﬀerences in the socioeconomic variables
while the rest is due to diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients including the country-
dummies (the unobservables). Moving along in the Table, the next two
columns show the decomposition controlling for only perception variables.
These variables explain more than half of the total deviation for Greece
(0.2207), while the rest (0.1870) is explained by the coeﬃcients. Finally,
in the last two columns, we control for both socioeconomic variables and
perceptions. Together, the distributions of these two groups of variables
explain 54.6 percent of the total deviation.
Note that since we measure the total deviation as the diﬀerence between
the average of country i and the EU-15 average, deviations are negative for
some countries. For, e.g., Sweden, the total deviation is -0.2950, which means
that in Sweden, there is a lower probability of being against immigration
compared to the average in the EU-15. When we control for socioeconomic
variables, -0.0243 of this is explained by diﬀerences in the distributions of
these variables whereas the rest is due to diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients. Dif-
ferences in perceptions, on the other hand, can explain 0.1130 of the total
deviation and together both types of variables explain 0.1136 of the total
deviation.
Hence, both Sweden and Greece get closer to the EU-15 average when
controlling for socioeconomic and, especially, perception variables. Other
countries get further away from the EU-15 average. This is the case for,
e.g., Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In fact, the distance from the EU-15
average is larger for about half of the countries after the decomposition than
before.
[Insert Table 5.1 around here]
The decomposition for the second attitude measure (part B of the Ta-
ble) shows almost the same picture. Luxembourg, in particular, gets further
and further away from the EU-15 average as we control for first socioeco-
nomic and then perception variables. On the other hand, Portugal deviates
markedly from the EU-15 average before the decomposition, but then moves
closer when we control for the diﬀerent variables. For the third dependent
variable (part C of the Table), which measures attitudes towards poor non-
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European countries in 2004/5, the decomposition causes most countries to
move further away from the EU-15 average after controlling for the socioe-
conomic variables, which are the only variables available for this regression.
For the relative attitude variable (part D of the Table), absolute deviations
are smaller, but the picture from the decomposition is the same.
Now, taken together, do country averages get closer together when con-
trolling for socioeconomic diﬀerences and perceptions? This can be seen by
considering the standard deviations reported at the bottom of Table 5.1.
The standard deviation below the third column, for example, reports the
standard deviation of the diﬀerences remaining after controlling for socioeco-
nomic characteristics. It is clear that although several of the countries move
further away from the EU average, overall the standard deviation is reduced
when controlling for observable characteristics. Controlling for socioeconomic
diﬀerences reduces the standard deviation by 1-6% while controlling for per-
ceptions reduces the standard deviation by around 25% for the first two
measures and by 15% for the relative attitude measure.
Thus, although socioeconomic characteristics are important determinants
of attitudes towards immigration, diﬀerences in the distributions of these
characteristics can only explain a minor share of the cross-country diﬀer-
ences in average attitudes. As an example, while education is important for
the individual attitude towards immigration, diﬀerences in educational lev-
els across countries cannot explain why some countries appear more hostile
than others towards further immigration. Diﬀerent perceptions, on the other
hand, may explain a significant share of the cross-country diﬀerences, but
the main share is left unexplained. These results are potentially interest-
ing in light of the recent harmonization discussions and eﬀorts in relation to
EU immigration policies. While measures targeted at certain socioeconomic
groups are unlikely to mitigate country diﬀerences in attitudes to a large
extent, it may be crucial for politicians to address the concerns related to
the perception variables in a common EU immigration policy. Furthermore,
it raises several perspectives for future research as discussed below.
6 Conclusion
This paper has documented that attitudes towards further immigration —
either European (EU enlargements) or non-European — vary considerably
across countries. Despite the fact that socioeconomic characteristics are im-
portant determinants of attitudes — and have been used extensively in the
existing literature in modelling attitudes — they can only explain a modest
share of the cross-country diﬀerences in average attitudes towards immi-
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gration. A much larger share can be explained by diﬀerences in perceived
consequences of immigration, but the main share still remains unexplained.
While contributing to a better understanding of the roots of cross-country
diﬀerences, the results also have immediate implications for policy makers if
they are to ensure that a common immigration policy receives widespread
acceptance. As socioeconomic diﬀerences cannot explain much of the dif-
ferences, addressing compensating measures or special attention towards the
most sceptical socioeconomic groups will not resolve country diﬀerences. In-
stead, as perceived consequences can explain much more of the cross-country
diﬀerences, it may be crucial for policy makers to address these concerns
explicitly in a common immigration policy. As substantial cross-country dif-
ferences prevail after controlling for diﬀerences in socioeconomic characteris-
tics (the usual suspects) and perceived consequences of immigration, specific
country considerations may also have to be incorporated in a common immi-
gration policy for the EU countries.
The findings in this paper also raise a number of questions for future
research. First, why do perceived consequences vary across individuals and
countries? Second, what underlies the large unexplained cross-country dif-
ferences? The answers to these questions may be closely related, and some
work has already been initiated with the aim of understanding cross-country
diﬀerences in attitudes towards immigration. Mayda (2006) has found that
the cross-country diﬀerences may reflect diﬀerences in the skill composition
of natives relative to immigrants with more skill-intensive countries being
more positive towards (low-skilled) immigration. Boeri and Brücker (2005)
find that countries with more generous social welfare systems and more rigid
wage setting institutions tend to be more negative towards immigration. Fi-
nally, Card et al. (2005) suggest that diﬀerences may be due to several
factors, including migration policy, migration experiences, and current state
of the economy. The relative importance of these diﬀerent hypotheses in
explaining remaining cross-country diﬀerences should be explored in future
work, possibly combining ESS data with data on country-level information
about migration composition, history, and institutions.
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Apoor_euro Apoor_noneuro_2002 Apoor_noneuro_2004 Arelative_euro
AT 0.6325 0.673 0.5203 0.1541
BE 0.3955 0.451 0.5107 0.1702
DE 0.3728 0.424 0.5608 0.1795
DK 0.4581 0.560 0.6080 0.2674
ES 0.5084 0.528 0.4665 0.1303
FI 0.5837 0.642 0.6839 0.1928
FR 0.4275 0.490 0.5394 0.1483
GB 0.4777 0.525 0.5080 0.1644
GR 0.8414 0.863 0.8224 0.2518
IE 0.3252 0.373 0.3626 0.1387
IT 0.3506 0.386 0.0000 0.1915
LU 0.4988 0.539 0.5222 0.1017
NL 0.4249 0.450 0.4895 0.1016
PT 0.6301 0.648 0.7042 0.1248
SE 0.1385 0.160 0.1959 0.0845
EU 0.4335 0.478 0.5324 0.1597
Table 2.1: Average attitudes towards immigration
Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics for socioeconomic and perception variables for ESS 2002/3 (weighted)
AT BE DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU NL PT SE
age 44.613 45.664 48.263 48.134 46.120 48.870 45.854 46.323 48.052 45.802 45.607 42.686 47.866 47.463 48.373
age squared 2,216 2,366 2,582 2,567 2,426 2,654 2,382 2,426 2,601 2,352 2,301 2,065 2,517 2,546 2,620
male 0.468 0.513 0.481 0.522 0.507 0.489 0.485 0.500 0.445 0.451 0.499 0.559 0.455 0.425 0.531
urban 0.300 0.258 0.332 0.377 0.300 0.266 0.321 0.300 0.526 0.330 0.117 0.206 0.282 0.349 0.327
immigrant 0.168 0.172 0.152 0.095 0.085 0.043 0.197 0.162 0.174 0.097 0.038 0.529 0.129 0.063 0.161
primary 0.537 0.316 0.117 0.193 0.618 0.345 0.511 0.556 0.566 0.434 0.546 0.391 0.419 0.763 0.457
tertiary 0.107 0.235 0.243 0.250 0.171 0.302 0.266 0.232 0.122 0.147 0.070 0.186 0.244 0.088 0.322
unemployed 0.013 0.027 0.043 0.036 0.024 0.026 0.040 0.049 0.020 0.024 0.107 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.020
self employed 0.084 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.097 0.082 0.024 0.083 0.166 0.105 0.173 0.049 0.067 0.105 0.083
recipient of social benefits 0.093 0.095 0.140 0.110 0.047 0.124 0.112 0.245 0.101 0.075 0.165 0.066 0.102 0.081 0.091
poorest quartile 0.188 0.285 0.230 0.140 0.378 0.286 0.387 0.290 0.514 0.292 0.422 0.058 0.207 0.546 0.206
wages down 0.362 0.287 0.372 0.206 0.375 0.415 0.461 0.364 0.818 0.401 0.342 0.368 0.216 0.582 0.156
bad for poor 0.501 0.447 0.555 0.359 0.533 0.507 0.539 0.514 0.814 0.515 0.408 0.341 0.388 0.636 0.236
fill jobs 0.699 0.594 0.540 0.652 0.687 0.540 0.746 0.551 0.564 0.771 0.772 0.813 0.546 0.647 0.649
take jobs away 0.341 0.418 0.452 0.141 0.352 0.288 0.308 0.414 0.750 0.465 0.347 0.227 0.205 0.545 0.110
take more out 0.430 0.533 0.528 0.539 0.373 0.536 0.400 0.574 0.684 0.622 0.280 0.355 0.467 0.262 0.410
undermine culture 0.233 0.225 0.162 0.242 0.192 0.046 0.331 0.334 0.623 0.295 0.305 0.106 0.196 0.302 0.093
worsen crime 0.658 0.750 0.758 0.707 0.727 0.721 0.610 0.612 0.876 0.457 0.624 0.684 0.815 0.737 0.705
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Table 4.1: Estimation results for the four attitude measures
Apoor_euro Apoor_noneuro_2002 Apoor_noneuro_2004 Arelative_euro Apoor_euro Apoor_noneuro_2002 Arelative_euro
age 0.0015 -0.0049 0.0078 0.0025 -0.0050 -0.0127 -0.0020
(0.27) (-0.90) (1.65)* (0.36) (-0.85) (-2.14)** (-0.28)
age squared 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
(1.46) (3-01)*** (1.20) (1.63) (2.13)** (3.79)*** (1.99)**
male -0.0247 -0.0143 -0.0313 0.2188 -0.0772 -0.0660 0.1990
(-0.77) (-0.45) (-1.10) (5.36)*** (-2.23)** (-1.92)* (4.82)***
urban -0.0882 -0.1795 -0.1874 0.1169 -0.0470 -0.1493 0.1467
(-2.51)** (-5.18)*** (-6.11)*** (2.66)*** (-1.23) (-3.94)*** (3.30)***
immigrant -0.5350 -0.4398 -0.4081 0.0858 -0.3254 -0.2205 0.2034
(-11.03)*** (-9.40)*** (-10.11)*** (1.47) (-6.26)*** (-4.36)*** (3.42)***
primary 0.3411 0.3502 0.2664 -0.0360 0.1840 0.1928 -0.1239
(8.55)*** (8.85)*** (7.31)*** (-0.71) (4.23)*** (4.43)*** (-2.38)**
tertiary -0.6674 -0.5933 -0.7240 -0.3668 -0.3901 -0.3003 -0.2119
(-14.58)*** (-13.49)*** (-18.39)*** (-6.31)*** (-7.90)*** (-6.27)*** (-3.57)***
unemployed 0.3514 0.3052 0.2183 0.3037 0.2317 0.1794 0.2291
(5.57)*** (4.86)*** (1.94)* (3.88)*** (3.39)*** (2.61)*** (2.88)***
self employed 0.0046 -0.0351 0.0868 0.1684 0.0293 -0.0242 0.1792
(0.08) (-0.61) (1.50) (2.38)** (0.46) (-0.38)* (2.50)**
recipient of social benefits -0.0302 -0.0058 -0.0635 -0.0879 -0.0505 -0.0270 -0.0932
(-0.54) (-0.10) (-0.95) (-1.27) (-0.84) (-0.45) (-1.34)
poorest quartile 0.1662 0.1077 0.0241 -0.0575 0.1411 0.0730 -0.0795
(4.58)*** (2.99)*** (0.70) (-1.23) (3.58)*** (1.85)* (-1.68)*
wages down 0.4451 0.4279 0.2212
(11.62)*** (11.15)*** (4.76)***
bad for poor 0.4957 0.5479 0.2955
(13.04)*** (14.62)*** (6.18)***
fill jobs -0.4507 -0.4329 -0.0836
(-12.46)*** (-11.97)*** (-1.94)*
take jobs away 0.2496 0.2290 0.0287
(6.45)*** (5.91)*** (0.61)
take more out 0.4061 0.4136 0.1304
(10.70)*** (10.98)*** (2.78)***
undermine culture 0.8108 0.9116 0.3664
(19.47)*** (21.30)*** (7.54)***
worsen crime 0.4819 0.5082 0.3226
(11.88)*** (12.86)*** (6.25)***
constant -0.7064 -0.3544 -0.0085 -2.0118 -1.6897 -1.3325 -2.5364
(-5.27)*** (-2.67)*** (-0.07) (-11.55)*** (-11.14)*** (-8.83)*** (-13.77)***
Country dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Sample size 18717 18678 22439 18576 18717 18678 18576
Pseudo R2 0.0752 0.0712 0.0707 0.0191 0.1845 0.1887 0.0431
Log likelihood -11767.84 -11989.01 -14403.43 -8222.75 -10377.75 -10472.36 -8021.74
Logit: socioeconomic + perceptionsLogit: socioeconomic variables
Table 5.1 Decompositions of the four attitude measures
Part A
Apoor_euro Total
deviation diff X's diff coefficients diff X's diff coefficients diff X's diff coefficients
AT 0.1970 -0.0232 0.2202 -0.0248 0.2218 -0.0336 0.2306
BE -0.0382 -0.0101 -0.0281 -0.0079 -0.0302 -0.0111 -0.0271
DE -0.0602 -0.0359 -0.0243 0.0121 -0.0723 -0.0019 -0.0583
DK 0.0327 -0.0234 0.0562 -0.0507 0.0834 -0.0552 0.0879
ES 0.1043 0.0478 0.0566 -0.0257 0.1301 0.0048 0.0995
FI 0.1556 -0.0058 0.1614 -0.0290 0.1847 -0.0240 0.1796
FR -0.0034 -0.0072 0.0038 -0.0036 0.0002 -0.0065 0.0031
GB 0.0374 -0.0036 0.0410 0.0251 0.0123 0.0223 0.0151
GR 0.4076 0.0302 0.3774 0.2207 0.1870 0.2226 0.1850
IE -0.1126 0.0154 -0.1280 -0.0104 -0.1022 0.0004 -0.1129
IT -0.0831 0.0438 -0.1269 -0.0481 -0.0350 -0.0256 -0.0576
LU 0.0683 -0.0780 0.1463 -0.0937 0.1620 -0.1318 0.2002
NL -0.0073 -0.0109 0.0036 -0.0377 0.0304 -0.0365 0.0292
PT 0.1920 0.0638 0.1282 0.0414 0.1506 0.0726 0.1194
SE -0.2950 -0.0243 -0.2707 -0.1130 -0.1820 -0.1136 -0.1814
Std. Deviation 0.1631 0.1569 0.1215 0.1231
Part B
Apoor_noneuro_2002 Total
deviation diff X's diff coefficients diff X's diff coefficients diff X's diff coefficients
AT 0.1853 -0.0209 0.2062 -0.0241 0.2094 -0.0392 0.2245
BE -0.0351 -0.0047 -0.0305 -0.0062 -0.0289 -0.0113 -0.0239
DE -0.0483 -0.0318 -0.0165 0.0130 -0.0614 -0.0030 -0.0453
DK 0.0912 -0.0189 0.1102 -0.0480 0.1392 -0.0543 0.1455
ES 0.0612 0.0448 0.0164 -0.0248 0.0860 0.0009 0.0603
FI 0.1650 -0.0029 0.1678 -0.0284 0.1934 -0.0247 0.1896
FR 0.0084 -0.0062 0.0146 -0.0014 0.0098 -0.0081 0.0166
GB 0.0319 0.0026 0.0293 0.0251 0.0068 0.0239 0.0080
GR 0.3871 0.0230 0.3641 0.2207 0.1664 0.0115 0.3756
IE -0.1102 0.0120 -0.1222 -0.0105 -0.0997 -0.0073 -0.1029
IT -0.0776 0.0483 -0.1258 -0.0475 -0.0301 -0.0289 -0.0487
LU 0.0731 -0.0568 0.1300 -0.0944 0.1675 -0.1265 0.1996
NL -0.0296 -0.0058 -0.0238 -0.0349 0.0053 -0.0342 0.0046
PT 0.1632 0.0576 0.1057 0.0425 0.1207 0.0621 0.1011
SE -0.3213 -0.0185 -0.3029 -0.1150 -0.2063 -0.1136 -0.2077
Std. Deviation 0.1610 0.1583 0.1213 0.1483
Socioeconomic Perceptions Socio+perceptions
Socioeconomic Perceptions Socio+perceptions
Part C
Apoor_noneuro_2004 Total
deviation diff X's diff coefficients
AT -0.0140 -0.0718 0.0578
BE -0.0238 -0.0798 0.0560
DE 0.0255 -0.0902 0.1157
DK 0.0731 -0.0855 0.1585
ES 0.1210 -0.0709 0.1919
FI 0.1492 -0.0780 0.2273
FR 0.0046 -0.0748 0.0793
GB -0.0249 -0.0819 0.0570
GR 0.2880 -0.0722 0.3602
IE -0.1726 -0.0763 -0.0962
LU -0.0141 -0.0863 0.0722
NL -0.0444 -0.0764 0.0319
PT 0.1691 -0.0648 0.2338
SE -0.3392 -0.0754 -0.2637
Std. Deviation 0.1519 0.1507
Part D
Arelative_euro Total
deviation diff X's diff coefficients diff X's diff coefficients diff X's diff coefficients
AT 0.0215 -0.0050 0.0266 -0.0078 0.0294 -0.0070 0.0285
BE 0.0101 -0.0063 0.0163 -0.0069 0.0169 -0.0090 0.0191
DE 0.0162 -0.0028 0.0191 -0.0022 0.0185 0.0040 0.0122
DK 0.1032 -0.0002 0.1034 -0.0148 0.1180 -0.0097 0.1129
ES -0.0297 -0.0076 -0.0221 -0.0069 -0.0228 -0.0181 -0.0116
FI 0.0297 -0.0101 0.0399 -0.0128 0.0425 -0.0185 0.0482
FR -0.0136 -0.0159 0.0023 0.0009 -0.0145 -0.0122 -0.0014
GB -0.0009 -0.0096 0.0087 0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0050 0.0041
GR 0.0819 0.0030 0.0789 0.0637 0.0191 0.0664 0.0155
IE -0.0295 -0.0077 -0.0218 -0.0081 -0.0213 -0.0141 -0.0154
IT 0.0134 -0.0060 0.0194 -0.0132 0.0267 -0.0224 0.0358
LU -0.0606 -0.0076 -0.0530 -0.0243 -0.0373 -0.0216 -0.0391
NL -0.0616 -0.0112 -0.0505 -0.0121 -0.0495 -0.0194 -0.0422
PT -0.0033 -0.0069 0.0036 0.0112 -0.0144 -0.0030 -0.0003
SE -0.0806 -0.0086 -0.0720 -0.0321 -0.0486 -0.0346 -0.0461
Std. Deviation 0.0501 0.0472 0.0428 0.0403
Socioeconomic
Socioeconomic Perceptions Socio+perceptions
